Public Money & Management

Beyond the Westminster model: a myth that needs constant refreshing?

Ministers and civil servants operate within formally shared constitutional arrangements but increasingly divergent professional cultures. Ministers are drawn from, and remain accountable to, a political environment defined by electoral cycles, media scrutiny, and their parties. Civil servants, by contrast, are shaped by institutional norms of political impartiality and long-term organizational continuity. Where those two paradigms were once held in productive tension by well-understood constitutional conventions, that tension has now become corrosive. Ministers have grown more likely to publicly attribute blame to officials (particularly at the most senior level, with at least 10 permanent secretaries being removed from post early since 2020). Parliament has pressed for the personal accountability of named civil servants, and civil servants have responded by becoming more risk-averse and, in some cases, more deferential to ministerial preference than honest analysis would support. The consequences for the quality of policy advice, and for policy performance more broadly, are both substantive and cumulative.

We recognize that constitutional settlements which order the relationship between ministers and officials are neither natural nor permanent, but were forged at particular moments and have endured precisely because they proved adaptable to the pressures subsequently placed upon them. The Westminster model has been taken up and remade across its various jurisdictions at successive moments of acute strain, very often in the aftermath of war or state crisis. The recurrence in our own time of anxieties about honesty, impartiality, blame and accountability should not let us forget that these questions have been asked, and provisionally answered, before. Reflecting on that history may therefore help us gain perspective on contemporary pressures, and deepen our understanding of where present events might yet take us.

This PMM theme issue invites theoretical and empirical contributions that examine the minister–official relationship and its implications for how policy is made and delivered. We welcome papers that focus on either side of the relationship, or on the relationship itself, provided there is a clear connection to questions of policy performance or governance.

The primary focus of this PMM theme is the Westminster model, but comparative contributions that engage with one or more Westminster model jurisdictions are welcome. Papers that draw on Westminster experience to engage with broader theoretical frameworks in public administration will also be considered. We welcome submissions using qualitative, quantitative and mixed-methods designs, as well as conceptual and theoretical contributions that deepen understanding of the relationship and its implications.

Topics that are suitable for this PMM theme include, but are not limited to:

• The nature and dynamics of trust between ministers and civil servants.
• The politicization of advice and its consequences for advisory quality.
• Risk aversion, deference, and the suppression of honesty.
• Ethical and conduct standards.
• The role of special advisors in mediating the minister-official relationship.
• The consequences of ministerial turnover for policy continuity.
• The impact of organizational or departmental culture.
• Parliamentary accountability and the personal exposure of named officials.
• The constitutional position of ministers and/or civil servants.
• Historical perspectives on the cycle of strain and reform in the minister-official relationship, particularly those that reflect the impact of crises.

We also welcome contributions that explore other relevant topics that align with our aims and scope.

Submission types

• Research articles (maximum 8000 words): subject to double-blind peer review by academic and practitioner reviewers.
• New development articles (maximum 3500 words): shorter, innovative insights, usually peer reviewed.
• Debate articles (maximum 1000 words): provocative pieces to stimulate discussion accepted at the theme editors' and PMM's editors' discretion, occasionally peer reviewed.

The journal

PMM has a long-established reputation for creating dialogue between researchers and practitioners and between people working in public finance and public management (https://www.tandfonline.com/journals/rpmm20/about-this-journal). PMM’s articles are edited to be easily accessible to multiple readers. The journal’s editorial team (editors, board and publisher) are committed to PMM’s articles being read by practitioners and policy-makers who need to understand the latest research evidence.

The theme editors

Leighton Andrews is Professor of Practice in Public Service Leadership and Innovation at Cardiff Business School. He teaches, researches and writes in the fields of government, public leadership and innovation, regulation and governance of media, social media and digital. His most recent book is Ministerial Leadership: Practice, Performance and Power (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024). His other books include Facebook, the Media and Democracy (Routledge, 2019); Ministering to Education (Parthian, 2014) and Wales Says Yes (Seren, 1999). He is a former Minister in the Welsh Labour Governments between 2007 and 2016. He was the elected Assembly Member for the Rhondda from 2003 to 2016. He had previously worked in the private and third sectors, and as the BBC's Head of Public Affairs in London from 1993 to 1996 during its Charter Renewal campaign.

Matt Collins is a post-doctoral researcher at Cardiff University interested in UK politics and public administration. Matt mainly investigates issues to do with the Civil Service, ministers, and the relationship between the two. They are particularly interested in the different expertises prevalent amongst those workforces; how they are developed, and the impact of their presence (or lack thereof) on policy outcomes. They are also interested in the changing nature of trust and accountability, and how members of parliament and the public alike hold the executive to account.