How to Control Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons
Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament Special Issue Call for Papers
Deadline: 30 April 2019
Many of the existing nuclear warheads are loaded in non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia stores all of its non-strategic nuclear weapons in its soil, while the United States shares the same policy except regarding a small number of non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in NATO countries. But this policy is only based on a US-Russia bilateral gentlemen agreement but not on a legally binding treaty. The only major existing instrument to control this type of arms is the US-Russia Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Meanwhile, the current administrations in both Russia and the US have begun to give more priority on non-strategic nuclear weapons as “easily usable nuclear weapons,” and have considered a plan to deploy this type of arms overseas.
Against this backdrop, the question we now need to ask is how to control non-strategic nuclear weapons between Russia and the US and in a global scale. In this special feature, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament (J-PAND) editors wish to call for papers related to the topics and questions that may include, but not be limited to;
- Is it desirable to abandon a way of thinking in the Cold War era that differentiates strategic nuclear weapons from non-strategic ones?
- Is it necessary to control non-strategic nuclear weapons region by region and on a bilateral basis between rival countries such as India-Pakistan, China-India or China-Russia, or on a global scale?
- Is it impossible to control non-strategic nuclear weapons by regulating delivery means such as missiles? Is a total prohibition on nuclear warheads (as is stipulated in the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) the only way to control non-strategic nuclear weapons? If so, what are effective arms control measures in a transition period?
If you have any inquiries, please contact Managing Editor - Hibiki YAMAGUCHI at firstname.lastname@example.org